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An Efficient Location Privacy Protection Scheme Based on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem
Jingjing Wang , Yiliang Han, and Xiaoyuan Yang
Abstract: Traditional k -anonymity schemes cannot protect a user’s privacy perfectly in big data and mobile network
environments. In fact, existing k -anonymity schemes only protect location in datasets with small granularity. But in
larger granularity datasets, a user’s geographical region-location is always exposed in realizations of k-anonymity
because of interaction with neighboring nodes. And if a user could not find enough adjacent access points, most
existing schemes would be invalid. How to protect location information has become an important issue. But it has
not attracted much attention. To solve this problem, two location-privacy protection models are proposed. Then
a new generalized k -anonymity Location Privacy Protection Scheme based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem
(LPSS-CRT) in Location-Based Services (LBSs) is proposed. We prove that it can guarantee that users can access
LBSs without leaking their region-location information, which means the scheme can achieve perfect anonymity.
Analysis shows that LPPS-CRT is more secure in protecting location privacy, including region information, and is
more efficient, than similar schemes. It is suitable for dynamic environments for different users’ privacy protection
requests.
Key words: location privacy protection; generalized k-anonymity; location-based services; the Chinese remainder
theorem

1

Introduction

More and more people join in the social networks to
share information, and generate a lot of data thereby.
But users do not want to open their data to the
public or the service provider. Especially in modern
wireless networks or mobile networks equipped with
GPS facilities, Location-Based Services (LBSs) provide
personalized services to mobile users based on their
geographical locations.
However, this can be a double-edged sword. When
users seek more benefits from LBSs, they have to accept
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abrogation of privacy as a cost. During LBS queries,
user location information[1] is in danger of leaking out.
Most people do not want to publish their location,
even their geographical regions too. Take an important
government officer for example. His special position
may require his location to be kept secret. His address
is 239 Wall Street, New York City, New York, USA.
Of course, he wants to keep his home address secret
when he asks for LBSs. But he wants even his region—
New York or USA—to be confidential. How to protect
all the location information secret mentioned above
in LBSs has become a hot topic. However, most
new mobile social network applications, especially
LBSs, publish user location information[2] . As a result,
a large number of newer methods for location data
confidentiality preservation are now being proposed;
they employ randomization[3] , space-vagueness[4] , and
time-vagueness[5] . Because of its moderate computation
cost and easy implementation, space-vagueness is
the most popular of these. k-anonymity is the main
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approach to realize space-vagueness. It can obscure a
precise location among k locations. To a user, k is static
and is a measure of the degree of his privacy protection.
To an attacker, k is dynamic, and restricts the precision
of the location he can discover for a user. The bigger k
is, the better the anonymity effect is.

2

Related Research and Problems

Location Privacy Protection Mechanisms (LPPMs)
have been open challenges for decades. In the last
ten years, many schemes have been proposed to allow
users to make use of LBSs while mitigating privacy
concerns[6–13] . These methods are used to let users
submit false location data to prevent attackers from
obtaining their real location information.
2.1

k-anonymity technology

In modern social networks, there has been considerable
research on location privacy protection. As described in
Ref. [6], location privacy protection technology based
on k-anonymity has been impressively refined.
k-anonymity is an important information security
concept. When publishing data, location data should
be erased first; then the data should be generalized
into clusters of k entries that published together[7] . kanonymity is one way to realize space-vagueness. It can
prevent an attacker from distinguishing the location of
a particular user.
k-anonymity technology was first used in location
privacy preserving by Gruteser and Grunwald in
2003[8] , by generalizing user location into k adjacent
access points in one region. Because it manifests as
adjacent points in an area, it cannot protect the located
region from leaking.
2.2

Location Privacy Protection Schemes (LPPSs)
in LBSs

Research about how to protect location data in locationbased services had a rather late start. In 2011, Huang et
al.[9] proposed a method for location privacy preserving
in location services, but the time for user to get location
services increases greatly when k increases, it is very
slow, and it also exposes the user’s region.
In 2013, Damiani and Cuijpers[10] pointed out that
the user’s region is an important part of location
privacy. They proposed a protection scheme based on
privacy policy, namely using a controllable coordinate
granularity mechanism to confine the precision of
location gotten by the location provider, but it is
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not sufficiently efficient for mobile Internet use. In
2014, Yang et al.[11] proposed an LBS-oriented location
privacy protection model and scheme. Their model took
the central server as a completely trusted third party,
which is always an additional threat to security and
privacy in real applications. Focusing on the security
problems of models and schemes, Peng et al.[12]
proposed a method to judge the location privacy attacks
in terms of the located region. In 2015 Wang et al.[6]
proposed a location privacy protection approach named
KAP, based on graph topology model, integrating the
concept of k-anonymity. The approach does not take
the location provider as a trusted party and has stronger
security, but it needs a number of other access points’
data around the user during every location service
query. And if the user can not detect enough adjacent
points, its algorithm will be invalid. Zhang et al.[1] put
forward some classical methods and a model to evaluate
LPPMs.
In conclusion, many existing studies are focused
on the privacy problems introduced by the user’s
continuous location sharing in the worst cases, but
most of the proposed solutions are not feasible in
real applications, and some problems still need to be
resolved urgently[13] .
In summary, there are several problems in the
research on location privacy preservation in LBS.
(1) In modern location services, the user does not
get location data depending on his terminal devices as
traditional GPS location technology does, but rather
requests location services from a Location Provider
(LP). When accessing a location service, the user’s
location data is generated in the LP. Then the data will
be sent to the user through the network. Therefore, we
should pay attention to helping the user get his location
data securely, without leaking confidential location
information. Typically, the LP is not to be trusted.
(2) In the existing schemes based on k-anonymity,
the basic approach is to hide the user’s real location
data in an area including the user and at least k 1
other access points around him. It’s important to note
that through the schemes based on k-anonymity, the
office’s specific address is obscured with other k 1
different addresses in one region. The region may be
“New York” or “USA” as mentioned in the example.
But the officer’s current region is always published by
the existing schemes at the same time. So the privacy
protection is not so perfect.
(3) In social networks, different users have various
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kinds of location privacy protection requests. Even the
same user may have diverse privacy protection needs
at different times. How to protect and to what degree
are important elements for user consideration. As such,
a robust, dependable, secure, and efficient privacy
protection system is needed. This system should support
different privacy-preserving functions to respond to the
user’s different requests.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows:
(1) Two kinds of location-privacy protection models
are given. One has a “third-party trust servicer”, while
the other does not. These models can be chosen freely
according to the real environment.
(2) A generalized LPPS based on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (LPPS-CRT) is proposed. LPSSCRT can guarantee the user’s good LBSs without
leaking any of their location information, even their
regions.
This is the main difference with other
k-anonymity schemes. Our approach can respond
to queries in response to different privacy-protection
demands, with relatively low communication loads.
It can achieve perfect privacy when needed, is more
efficient than other similar schemes, and is suitable for
environments in which user privacy-protection demands
vary.

3

Our Scheme

To achieve perfect location privacy, we must protect the
user’s specific location. On the other hand, we must
also pay attention to the user’s region. And the method
should be feasible and efficient. This will require a
mathematical tool that obeys certain constraints.
(1) The tool can generalize a single locational
identifer into k identifies, to support the basic function
of k-anonymity.
(2) The generalized data should be such that an
attacker cannot distinguish one locational entry from
any other. Mathematically, the data consists of an
equivalence set.
(3) The values of the k entries belonging to one
equivalence class should not be similar; the k access
points published should not be close to each other.
If they are, the user’s region information would be
exposed, abrogating location privacy.
(4) The number k should be changeable, so as to meet
different privacy demands in real applications.
(5) If some user asks for location services contiously
for several times during a period of time, the
generalized data published each time should be
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relatively reachable in a rational speed. Otherwise, the
privacy of location would be exposed.
Surprisingly, the CRT meets all the above
conditions. It can be used for location-data protection
and has unexpected advantages in this application.
The CRT was first proposed in third–fifth century
BC by Chinese militarist and mathematician Sun
Tzu in his book Sun’s Mathematical Classic, and
was proved by Gauss in the 19th century. The
CRT is a theorem about congruences in number
theory and their generalizations in abstract algebra. It
was a major contribution to the development of
mathematics. The CRT has found wide application
in modern cryptography, and is used in digital
group signatures, threshold secret schemes, digital
fingerprints, etc.
In this paper, in combination with the idea of
generalized k-anonymity, a new kind of LPPS in
location services based on the CRT is designed.
3.1

Basic definition

Definition 1 CRT: Suppose fm1 , m2 , . . . , mk g are
positive integers, and they are pairwise co-prime. Then,
for any given sequence of integers: fa1 , a2 , . . . , ak g,
there is some integer x that meets all the equations in
Eq. (1) simultaneously. And there is no single solution
of these equations; a solution set can involve different
integers.
8
ˆ x  a1 mod m1 ;
ˆ
ˆ
< x  a mod m ;
2
2
(1)
ˆ
 ;
ˆ
ˆ
:
x  ak mod mk
And if
M D m1  m2      mk ;
M
Mi D
;
mi
1
Mi Mi D 1 mod mi ;
then we can compute the solution set of Eq. (1):
X D M1 M1 1 a1 CM2 M2 1 a2 C  CMk Mk 1 ak mod M
(2)
namely
X D M1 M1 1 a1 C M2 M2 1 a2 C    C
Mk Mk 1 ak C I  M; I 2 Z
(3)
˚
Consider X D x1 ; : : : ; xi ; : : : ; xj ; : : : . Obviously, xi
is included in the solution set X .
Through Eq. (3), we see that I can be chosen
randomly. If we choose I as different values, we can
get different integers xi to satify all the equations in
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Eq. (1). According to abstract algebra, the solution set
X is an equivalence class. We note that the elements
of X are determined by different values of I . These
elements have some relationship with each other too;
that is, M j.xi xj /.
Definition 2 Equivalence Class: In modern algebra,
when a set has an equivalence relation defined on its
elements, there is a natural grouping of elements that
are related to one another, forming what are called
equivalence classes.
Given a set x and an equivalence relation  on X , the
equivalence class of an element x in X is the subset of
all elements in X which are equivalent to x.
Mathematically, the solution set X in Definition 1
is an equivalence set, and its different results with
different I values all belong to the same equivalence
class. Therefore, we can mix the user’s real location
data into an equivalence set including k elements by the
CRT. Consequently, the k elements of the equivalence
set would not be distinguishable by an attacker. We say
that such a set has realized k-anonymity. If X is a set
of location coordinates, and is an equivalence class, we
say it can realize geo-indistinguishability:
Two kinds of k-anonymity schemes are shown in
Figs. 1 and 2. In these two schemes, we take the

Fig. 1 Illustration for the LPSS-CRT model with central
servicer.

Fig. 2

Illustration for the toy example.

263

location data of the user as a 3-tuple (longitude, latitude,
time). For the sake of simplicity, we use the 3-tuple (x,
y, t / to represent a location data instance.
Definition 3 Generalized k-Anonymity (GKA):
In location-based services, extend one user’s accurate
location data to k access points.
(1) These access points need not be adjacent
neighbors in one region or interact with the user during
location-based operations.
(2) These k access points must belong to an
equivalence class, so that an attacker will not be able
to tell which point is the user’s real location.
From this definition, we see that GKA is more
practical than the traditional definition[6–8] of kanonymity in complex social networks. We say that if a
scheme can realize GKA, it has realized k-anonymity.
3.2

LPPS-CRT with central service provider

Most research based on k-anonymity uses a trusted
third party—a central servicer[8] . The main function of
the central service provider is anonymity and agency
query, which is necessary for getting LBS.
Notations used in this section are as folows:
x: longitude of the user’s location;
x 0 : integerizaion result of the longitude;
y: latitude of the user’s location;
y 0 : integerizaion result of the latitude;
t : time when the user asks for service;
v: velocity when the user asks for service;
c: query content of the user;
k: level of privacy protection requested by the user;
I; I 0 2 Z W integers chosen in the process of CRT
computation.
The LPSS-CRT model with central servicer is shown
as Fig. 1
Step 1 Query: The user sends a message Q that
includes his location information, query contents, and
privacy request to the central anonymity servicer:
Q D fx; y; t; v; c; kg:
Step 2 GKA: The central servicer first expands the
accurate location of the user into an equivalence set
including k elements. Then it sends the query content
and the k elements as a query set to the location
provider.
We describe the scheme using an example illustrating
the process in this step:
(1) Choose m1 ; m2 ; : : : ; mk randomly, satisfying the
refinement condition:
m1 ; m2 ;    ; mk 2 ZC ; gcd.mi ; mj / D 1; i; j 2 ZC :
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If the user does not want to leak his region
information, make sure m1  m2      mk  104
(because here we take the precision of coordinates up to
four decimal palces). Then the returned results are far
apart from each other. If the user does not care about
his current region information, m1 ; m2 ; : : : ; mk can be
chosen randomly even its product is very small. In this
case, the results returned are adjacent to each other.
To explain this process, we give a toy example, and
choose geographic coordinates as the parameters in the
example. In this example the parameters can be chosen
freely.
A Toy Example:
Suppose
k D 3; .x; y/ D .108:9000ı ; 34:2670ı /;
.m1 ; m2 ; m3 / D .13; 17; 113/;
.n1 ; n2 ; n3 / D .13; 45; 92/:
(2) Integerization:
.x; y/ D .108:9000ı ; 34:2670ı / !
.x 0 ; y 0 / D .x  104 ; y  104 /;
.x 0 ; y 0 / D .1 089 000; 342 670/:
(3) Then we can get the equation sets based on the
CRT:
8
8
0
0
ˆ
ˆ
< y  b1 mod 13;
< x  a1 mod 13;
0
y 0  b2 mod 45;
x  a2 mod 17; and
ˆ
ˆ
: y 0  b mod 92:
: x 0  a mod 113:
3
3
Namely:
8
8
ˆ
ˆ
< Y  3 mod 13;
< X  3 mod 13;
Y  40 mod 45;
X  14 mod 17; and
ˆ
ˆ
: Y  62 mod 92:
: X  19 mod 113:
(4) Compute the solution set of the equation sets
above:
X D 15 161 C 24 973I; I 2 ZI
Y D 19 750 C 53 820I 0 ; I 0 2 Z:
(5) Choose two other data points (xi , yj / randomly
in the solution set, for example:
.x10 ; y10 / D .264 891; 557 950/; I1 D 10; I10 D 10I
.x20 ; y20 / D .514 621; 1 096 150/; I2 D 20; I20 D 20
(4)
The location coordinates extended from the real
location are:
.x1 ; y1 / D .26:4891ı ; 55:7950ı /;
.x2 ; y2 / D .51:4621ı ; 109:6150ı / D
.51:4621ı ; 19:6150ıs /:
Here, the subscript “s” means south latitude. We can
mark three access points computed in different areas in
Fig. 2.

Besides, it is necessary to note that, the integers I
and I 0 can be chosen randomly according to the user’s
request in reality. For example, assume the user is a
businessman, who is always traveling to different cities
to do his business all over the world. He wants to
keep his location region as a business secret too and
does not concern about the price of services. Then the
integers I2 and I20 that are greatly different from I1 and
I10 can be chosen for him in the continuous services,
so that all the location coordinates extended from his
real location are widely distributed in different regions
all over the world. If the user lives in a single region,
and does not mind other people knowing his location
area, jI1 I2 j and jI1 I20 j can be smaller. In this
case, the extended location coordinates may be close to
each other—even in the same region. In this way, our
definition of generalized k-anonymity is realized. It can
protect the user’s privacy if needed, which is better than
the results provided by the traditional definition of kanonymity.
(6) Send the query message KAC to the location
provider:
KAC D f.x1 ; y1 /; .x2 ; y2 /; .x; y/; c; tg:
Step 3 LBS: The location provider offers the query
results set QC to the central servicer:
QC D fc1 ; c2 ; c; t 0 g:
The central servicer finds the accurate result c in the
set, and computes r according to the time interval and
velocity:
r D v.t 0 t /:
Through the radius r and the original location shown
in Fig. 3, the central servicer can judge the current area
of the user. Then it can send c to the user in the located
area timely. In this step, because the time of computing
r is very short, so it almost can be neglected.
3.3

LPPS-CRT without central servicer

Although schemes with central servicer relieve users
of the computation loads and have other advantages,

Fig. 3

Illustration for location-based service.

Jingjing Wang et al.: An Efficient Location Privacy Protection Scheme Based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem

they have some weaknesses: (1) the central servicer
is not always dependable, especially in complicated
social networks; (2) the central servicer can be a
performance bottleneck and the concentrated target
may thus suffer many attacks; (3) the central servicer
will require more computation and communication
sources for agency query. So we must take the privacy
preseving scheme without center servicer into account.
We give a description of this scheme in Fig. 4. Since
the computation process of this scheme is similar to that
of scheme in Section 3.2, we give a brief explanation.
Operation 1 GKA: The user chooses his level
of privacy as k and the radius r of his region to be
located next. r is the user’s expected range of his next
movements to ensure that the user can get accurate
location results later.
Then the user will carry out the process of a kanonymity computation based on the CRT to confuse
the accurate location coordinates into an equivalence set
including k different location coordinates. The method
is the same as Step 2 of the scheme in Section 3.2, so
here we do not give more details.
However, there are still some differences in this
scheme. Since there is no central service r, if there
is a communication interruption, the user cannot get a
response to his location service request timely anymore.
Since the user’s terminal device has some computation
and communication capabilities in modern era, we
must take these resources into consideration to avoid
this problem. He can interact with his neighbors by
either single-hop or multi-hop mode to recover his
communication with the location servicer and regain
access to a location-based servicer.
Through the CRT computation, we can obtain the
space-vagueness (k-anonymity) set of the location

coordinates, which is
.X; Y / D f.x1 ; y1 /; : : : ; .xk

1 ; yk 1 /; .x; y/g:

Operation 2 Query: The user sends message Q
directly to the location provider:
Q D f.x1 ; y1 /; : : :; .xk 1 ; yk 1 /; .x; y/; c; rg:
Operation 3 LBS: The location provider offers the
query results set QCi , i 2 1; 2; : : : ; k to the k regions
with radius r, which includes k different location
coordinates received.
QC1 D fc1 ; t 0 g to .x1 ; y1 /I
QC2 D fc2 ; t 0 g to .x2 ; y2 /I
:::
QCk 1 D fck 1 ; t 0 g to .xk 1 ; yk 1 /I
QCk D fc; t 0 g to .x; y/:
In the query results above, the message QCk =fc; t 0 g
is the location service result for the user, whose location
coordinates are (x, y/.
The user can get his query content in his location
region. It is important to say, the user’s expecting radius
r must be proper for the time interval spending on the
interactive query process, or else the query content may
be lost.
In this way, an LBS response is completed without a
central servicer.
Further, because the location provider needs to
support the computation loads for k access points
simultaneously for protecting one user’s location
privacy in fact, if the privacy request k of the user is
larger, the location privacy can charge more fees, which
is very practical.

4

Discussion and Analysis

The privacy protection technology of location data
not only needs to protect the user’s location data,
but also needs to balance the feasibility of services
and overhead[14] . In this section, we discuss three
aspects of the features and performance of our schemes,
as suggested in Refs. [1, 11]: (1) degree of privacy
preservation; (3) survivability of services; and (3)
computation and communication overhead.
4.1

Fig. 4 Illustration of the LPSS-CRT model without central
service r.
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Degree of privacy preservation

As mentioned in Ref. [1], researchers have indicated
that any notion of privacy is incomplete without explicit
statements regarding the capabilities of an attacker. So
when we begin to analyze a scheme, it is important
to admit that the adversary can get some information
from the interaction between the user and the LBS
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provider. In the following analysis, we will stipulate
that the attacker can get some information. We can
prove that LPPS-CRT can meet the conditions proposed
by the classic papers: uncertainty, untraceability, and
unpredictability:
Theorem 1: LPPS-CRT guarantees the user’s
location privacy request to a degree of at least  .
The notations used in this section are as follows.
t1 ; t2 ; t 0 : shown in Fig. 5. t1 is the time of getting
the former service; t2 is the time of getting the latter
service. For t1 < t 0 < t2 , there is no service during the
interval of time t1 and t2 .
P fUlit g: probability that the user is at location “li” at
time t.
D t : all the location data published that can be
collected by the attacker in the scheme with a central
servicer at time t.
L t : all the location data published that can be
collected by the attacker in the scheme without a central
servicer at time t.
: the highest location privacy leaking degree the
user can accept, namely the best attack result that can
be gained by an attacker.
Definition 4: If P fUlit2 jD t 0 g P fUlit2 g 6  for any
time t 0 , we say our scheme has guaranteed the user’s
location privacy request by a degree of at least  . If
 D 0, we say the scheme can guarantee perfect privacy
for a user accessing the location service.
Proof: Each time a user asks for service, we get an
equivalence class including his real location data by the
CRT. In this equivalence class, there are k elements with
equivalence relationship to each other. In theory, these
k elements have a uniform probability of being chosen
by the attacker, so we can say
1
P fUlit2 g D :
k
For illustration, we discuss the situation of two
successive user queries. If there are two successive

Fig. 5 Illustration for the time of two successive queries by
a user r ( 1 the former service; 2 the latter service).
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requests for services in a period of time, the former
occurs at time t1 and the latter occurs at time t2 .
(1) For a scheme with a central servicer
All the published location data the attacker can get at
time t 0 can be expressed as
D t 0 D f.x1 , y1 /, (x2 , y2 /, (x, y/g.
Even if the attacker gets the three access points’
location information shown in Fig. 6, he has no way
to identify one from another, which is uncertainty. If
I is fixed in these successive queries in the process of
the CRT computation, at t2 , the attacker can not tell
the user’s current location from access points A, B,
and C . Because computed by the CRT, A, B, and C
are all reachable relatively to their original location and
velocity published at the former query, namely at time
t1 . So the probabilities of A, B, and C are uniform to
the attacker, which is untraceability. That is to say, the
location data D t 0 does not help the attacker judge
the location of the user for the second time at
time t2 , which is unpredictability. Mathematically, the
probability is
1
P fUlit2 jD t 0 g D :
k
(2) For a scheme without a central servicer
All the published location data the attacker can get at
time t 0 is
L t 0 D f.x1 , y1 /, (x2 , y2 /, (x, y/, rg.
Compared with the scheme with a central servicer,
the attacker can get the expected radius r additionally
as more information to predict the user’s next location.
By the same token, for each successive query of
several service:
1
0
P fUlit g D :
k

Fig. 6 Illustration for successive queries by a user. The
dots stand for the extended location coordinates returned
the first time; the triangles stand for the extended location
coordinates returned the second time by the location service.
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For example, as for two successive queries, we can
see, in Fig. 6, that even if an attacker has information
about the three different areas with radius r as the
additional information to support his guess, i.e., to
guess which area and access point in the three points A,
B, and C is the actual current user location, he can not
identify it. Because of radius r, the three areas are all
respectively reasonable for the user’s original location.
So we have the posterior probability,
0
P fUlit L t 0 g
1
0
P fUlit jL t 0 g D
D :
P fL t 0 g
k
Then through the difference privacy method proposed
by Andrés and Bordenabe[15] , we can prove the
expression as follows:
0
0
P fUlit jL t 0 g P fUlit g D 0 6 :
The information entropy of the leaked location
privacy to the attacker
is
X
0
0
P fUlit g log P fUlit g
i

X

0

0

P fUlit jL t 0 g log P fUlit jL t 0 g D 0:

i

In fact, the different regions located by the radius
also form an equivalence class. In this case, it also
meets uncertainty, untraceability, and unpredictability
conditions.
If we choose proper parameters in our scheme, we
can prove that LPSS-CRT can guarantee perfect privacy,
uncertainty, untraceability, and unpredictability, for
users of LBSs.
4.2

Feasibility of services

Theorem 2: LPPS-CRT is feasible in real applications.
It supports high quality of service and reliability of
query results.
We prove its feasibility through two standards used
universally: (1) quality of service; and (2) reliability of
query results.
4.2.1 Quality of service
Definition 5: The quality of service can be judged
by the proportion of the number of successful privacy
requests n0 as k changes from 1 to n, namely the success
rate of anonymity.
Its math expression is
n0
RS D
 100%; n0 6 n:
n
Proof: Because we used the classic math tool CRT to
realize k-anonymity, when k is changed by the user, the
only additional step required is to choose more or fewer
values of I in the solution set according to different k:
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And the only additional condition is that I is an
integer. Whatever k is, the user can find enough
elements with equivalence relationships, so as to realize
changing privacy requests easily and smoothly, which
means RS  1 if the service provider and the terminal
devices run normally.
4.2.2

Reliability of query results

Definition 6: The reliability of query results can be
judged by the relationship of the distance between the
user’s original location l1 and the current location l t 0
when receiving a query result after a time interval and
the radius of the user’s location region.
For a scheme with a central servicer provider,
r D v.t 0 t1 / D v  t:
Here jl1 l t 0 j is the distance between location l1 and
location l t 0 .
jl1 l t 0 j
If
6 1, we say the query result is reliable
v  t
and accurate. Else, the query result can not be
received by the user, because the user’s new location has
gone beyond the communication range accepted by the
central servicer. In this case, the location-based service
is invalid.
For a scheme without a central servicer, r is the
expected radius of the user’s location area, which is
accepted by the location provider.
jl1 l t 0 j
6 1; we say the query result is also reliable
If
r
and accurate. Else, the query result can not be received
by the user because the user’s location has gone beyond
the communication range accepted by the location
provider. So the location service is also invalid. But
we can avoid this case by choosing proper parameters
in the scheme.
4.3

Performance

High efficiency is the main advantage of our scheme
when applied to social or mobile networks.
(1) In schemes with or without a central servicer,
the space-vagueness degree k can be changed easily
without increasing computation overhead.
To explain, we use the toy example and its figures
given in Section 3.2. When the user changes his privacy
request k as k D 4 in the current service (k D 3 in the
former service), the only overhead to add is choosing
another integer I randomly (for example, we chose
I D 30) and performing the computation of Eq. (4)
in the CRT, the equivalence set of four data are shown
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in Fig. 7a.
In another case, if the user wants to change k to 2,
i.e., he’d like to reduce his privacy protection level, it is
easier to realize. No more computation and new value
of I are needed. On the contrary, we can directly delete
one value of I already chosen in the last time service
at once to realize smooth request change, the result is
shown in Fig. 7b.
(2) Just as shown in Fig. 8, even k becomes larger,
the computation and communication overhead of both
center servicer and user’s terminal devices is almost
fixed because of the high efficiency of the CRT, which
is better than the other existing classical schemes.
To get other access points data, the users in our
scheme do not have to interact with other adjacent
users for several times in LBS, which is more optimal
than the existing schemes. Therefore, it can spare more
communication time and network source.

5

Conclusion and Future Work

A new LPPS-CRT for perfect privacy in location
Fig. 8 Results for the overhead comparison of our scheme
and classic schemes.

Fig. 7 Illustration for successive queries by the user in LBS.
The black dots are the extended location coordinates in the
last time service when k=3; the red triangle is the new fourth
extended location data computed in the successive location
service when k=4; the red cross means delete the access
point’s location data when k=2.

services, based on the CRT, is proposed in this paper.
In order to adapt to various practical environments, we
design two models. One depends on a trusted thirdparty server and the other does not.
The scheme can be proved to achieve good LBSs
for users without leaking the information of the user’s
location, even geo-location region. It thus overcomes
the disadvantage of existing k-anonymity schemes
that expose region information during interaction
with neighbor nodes. It can also meet different
location privacy preserving requests of users with high
efficiency. Increasing the protection level of privacy
does not increase the overhead significantly.
Our CRT-based scheme can resist the main attacks to
location privacy, such as center points attacks, shapecenter points offset attacks, indiscriminate attacks, etc.
In summary, LPSS-CRT is an efficient, practical, and
secure scheme.
Future research is on how to choose the parameters in
our scheme to get optimal results with perfect privacy
and the different user’s privacy preference in LBSs.
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